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1969 Act preempted the failure to warn 
actions to the extent they relied on a 
showing that manufacturers should have 
had additional warnings. [d. at 2621-
22. The Court, however, noted that the 
1969 Act did not preempt the petitioner's 
fuilure to warn claims that relied solely 
on the manufacturers' research or test-
ing practices or other actions unrelated 
to advertising. [d. at 2622. 
The Court next addressed the 
petitioner's claim for breach of express 
warranty. [d. Noting that an express 
warranty is not a requirement imposed 
under state law but is a voluntary under-
. taking by the manufacturer/warrantor, 
the Court stated that a claim for breach 
of warranty was not preempted by the 
1969 Act. [d. at 2622-23. 
Turning to the petitioner's allega-
tions of fraudulent misrepresentation, 
the Court first analyzed the claim that 
the manufacturers' advertising counter-
acted the effect of the federal warning 
labels. [d. at 2623. The Court stated that 
because section 5 of the 1969 Act pre-
empted state law prohibitions as well as 
requirements, the petitioner's claims 
based on state law prohibitions against 
advertising that minimized the hazards 
of smoking was preempted by the 1969 
Act. [d. In addressing the petitioner's 
second fraudulent misrepresentation 
claim based on allegations that the manu-
facturers intentionally concealed mate-
rial facts about the hazards of smoking, 
the Court noted that the petitioner's 
actions were not predicated on a duty 
under the 1969 Act but rather on a 
general duty not to deceive. [d. at 2624. 
Thus, the Court found that the 
petitioner's clams based on fraud in 
advertising were not preempted by the 
1969 Act. [d. 
Finally, the Court examined the 
petitioner's claim of conspiracy to mis-
represent [d The Court found that the 
conspimcy claim was not preempted 
because the underlying duty in such a 
claim was a duty not to conspire to 
commit fraud, rather than a duty im-
posed by the 1969 Act [d. at 2624-25. 
Justice Blackmun, after joining the 
majority in the opinion regarding the 
1965 Act, wrote separately for three 
justices and concluded that none of the 
petitioner's claims were preempted by 
the 1969 Act. [d. at 2625-26. Thus, 
Blackmun concurred only in the judg-
ment that certain claims based on fuilure 
to warn, fraudulent misrepresentation, 
express warranty and conspiracy were 
not preempted by the 1965 Act. [d. 
Justice Scalia, joined by Justice Tho-
mas, concluded that the 1965 Act pre-
empted petitioner's failure to warn 
claims and that the 1969 Act preempted 
allofthepetitioner'scommonlawclaims 
under the ordinary meaning of the statu-
tory language. [d. at 2632. Conse-
quently, Justice Scalia concurred only 
in the part of the judgment that held that 
the petitioner's failure to warn and 
fraudulent misrepresentation claims 
were preempted. [d. at 2637. 
In Cipollone, the Supreme Court 
held that under certain circumstances, 
cigarette manufacturers can be held li-
able for the health problems of smokers, 
notwithstanding the existence of warn-
ing labels on cigarette packages. Al-
though the ruling bars claims thatadver-
tising and labeling did not adequately 
warn smokers of the health hazards of 
smoking, it allows claims alleging mis-
representation, breach of express war-
ranty, conspiracy, and fraud as well as 
certain failure to warn claims. This 
decision may provoke thousands of new 
suits filed by smokers against tobacco 
companies. More significantly, 
Cipollone may have set a precedent to 
allow consumers to bring suit in cases 
involving any product regulated by the 
federal government, including over-the-
counter medications and alcoholic bev-
erages, in which manufacturers may 
have hidden or misrepresented possible 
side effects of their products to the 
public. 
-Ellen Ann Marth 
Burson v. Freeman: STATUTE 
PROHIBITING THE DISPLAY 
AND DISTRIBUTION OF CAM-
PAIGN MATERIALS WImIN 100 
FEET OF A POLLING PLACE 
DOES NOT VIOLATE mE FIRST 
AND FOURTEENTH AMEND-
MENTS. 
The Supreme Court affirmed the 
validity of a longstanding tradition of 
regulating campaign related speech in 
the areas surrounding a polling place. 
In Burson v. Freeman, 112 S. Ct. 1846 
(1992), a plurality of the Court held 
that a Tennessee law establishing a 
100-foot campaign free zone satisfied 
a strict scrutiny analysis because it was 
necessary to serve a compelling state 
interest and was narrowly drawn to 
achieve that end. This opinion may 
prove to be more important because 
the substance of the statute, which 
regulated expressive conduct near a 
polling place, was upheld by only a 
plurality of the Court. 
Respondent, Mary Rebecca Free-
man ("Freeman"), filed suit in the Chan-
cery Court while working as treasurer 
for a political campaign in Tennessee. 
Freemanallegedthatsection2-7-111(b) 
of the Tennessee Code, which prohib-
its the solicitation of votes and the 
display or distribution of campaign 
material within 100 feet of a polling 
place, unconstitutionally restricted her 
ability to communicate with voters in 
violation of her rights under the First 
and Fourteenth Amendments to the 
United States Constitution. The court 
dismissed her suit, finding that the law 
was not in violation of either the Ten-
nessee or the United States Constitu-
tions. The Tennessee Supreme Court 
reversed, reasoning that the State had a 
compelling interest in banning such 
activities inside the polling place but 
not in the area surrounding it. The 
court concluded that the law was not 
narrowly drawn and that it did not 
represent the least restrictive means 
available to protect the State's interest. 
The United States Supreme Court 
granted certiorari, reversed, and up-
held the Tennessee statute because it 
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satisfied strict scrutiny. 
The Court began its analysis by 
noting that the First Amendment pro-
hibits Congress from passing any law 
abridging a person's right to freedom 
of speech. Id at 1849-50. The Court 
recognized that "[t]he Tennessee stat-
ute implicates three central concerns in 
our First Amendment jurisprudence: 
regulation of political speech, regula-
tion of speech in a public forum, and 
regulation based on the content of the 
speech." Id at 1850. Addressing the 
last issue, the Court asserted that con-
tent-based restriction must be subjected 
to strict scrutiny. Id. at 1851. Thus, the 
State was required to show that the 
regulation was necessary to serve a 
compelling state interest and that it 
was narrowly drawn to achieve that 
end. Id. (citing Perry Education Assn. 
v. Perry Loan Educators' Assn., 460 
U.S. 37,45 (1983». 
The State asserted that section 2-7-
111(b) furthered Tennessee's compel-
ling interest in protecting each citizen's 
right to vote freely and in maintaining 
the integrity and reliability of the elec-
tion. Burson, 112 S. Ct. at 1851. The 
Court agreed that these concerns repre-
sented compelling state interests. Id. 
at 1851-52. The Court opined, how-
ever, that in order for a statute to satisfy 
strict scrutiny the State must show that 
the law is necessary to serve the as-
serted interest. Id. at 1852. The Court 
looked to the history of election reform 
and concluded that regulations con-
cerning conduct around polling places 
were necessary to maintain secrecy 
and to prevent bribery and intimida-
tion in the voting process. Id Thus, 
the Court concluded that the wide 
spread and longstanding practice of 
imposing restricted zones around poll-
ing places substantiated the necessity 
for the Tennessee statute. Id 
Freeman advanced three arguments 
in opposition to this conclusion. First, 
he argued that the statute was 
overinclusive because the State could 
protect its interests through statutes 
that would make it a misdemeanor to 
interfere with voting. Id at 1855. The 
Court ruled, however, that such stat-
utes would not be effective because 
they would address only the most bla-
tant acts. Id. Second, Freeman argued 
that the statute was underinclusive be-
cause it did not regulate all speech ld 
The Court responded that this was not 
a valid objection because "[t]he First 
Amendment does not require States to 
regulate for problems that do not ex-
ist." Id. at 1856. Through this asser-
tion the Court established that states do 
not have an obligation to restrict con-
duct that is not harmful. Finally, Free-
man argued that the Court confused 
history with necessity, but the Court 
held that the only way to preserve 
secrecy in voting was to limit access to 
the voting area. Id 
In determining that the statute was 
narrowly drawn, the Court held that a 
State is not required to empirically 
show that the zone established in the 
statute is perfectly tailored to serve the 
state interest. Id. The plurality rea-
soned that because similar laws date 
back to the 1890's, it would be very 
difficult for the State to present evi-
dence concerning what would happen 
without them. Id. The Court noted that 
it would be similarly difficult to isolate 
the effect such a statute has on prevent-
ing voter intimidation and fraud be-
cause successful intimidation and fraud 
is often undetected. Id Thus, the Court 
held that a state legislature should be 
permitted to respond to potential diffi-
culties so long as it does not signifi-
cantly impinge upon constitutionally 
protected rights. Id. at 1856-57 (quot-
ingMonroev. Socialist Workers Party, 
479 U.S. 189, 195-96 (1986». The 
Court then opined that a 100-foot 
boundary represented a "minor geo-
graphic limitation," and, therefore, did 
not significantly impinge on the right 
to free speech. Burson, 112 S. Ct. at 
1857. 
Justice Scalia filed an opinion con-
curring in judgment. He concl uded 
that the law, although admittedly con-
tent-based, was constitutional because 
it was a "reasonable, viewpoint-neu-
tral regulation of a non-public forum. i, 
Id. at 1859. Contrary to the opinion of 
the plurality, Justice Scalia reasoned 
that similar statutes restricting activi-
ties on street and sidewalks surround-
ing polling places have been widely 
used since the late 19th century, and 
that these areas traditionally have not 
been devoted to assembly and debate 
and cannot be categorized as a public 
forum. ld. at 1860. Therefore, statutes 
such as Tennessee's need only be rea-
sonable and viewpoint-neutral and need 
not be subjected to strict scrutiny. Id. 
(citing Perry Education Assn. v. Perry 
Local Educators' Assn., 460 U.S. 37, 
46 (1983». Adopting the plurality's 
rationale in reaching the conclusion 
that the statute satisfied strict scrutiny, 
Scalia asserted that the statue was rea-
sonable and, because Freeman did not 
contend that it was viewpoint-discrimi-
natory, he found it to be constitutional. 
Justices O'Connor and Souter joined 
Justice Stevens' dissent, asserting that 
the State failed to show that the cam-
paign-free zone law was necessary to 
protect a compelling state interest and 
that the statute was narrowly drawn. 
The dissent first contended that the 
statute was unconstitutionally 
overbroad. ld. at 1861. Stevens noted 
that the Tennessee regulated zone en-
compassed at least 30,000 square feet 
around each polling facility, but other 
states have no problem maintaining 
the integrity of elections by imposing 
campaign free zones of 50 feet or less. 
ld In addition, the dissent argued that 
the statute prohibits legitimate expres-
sive conduct such as wearing a cam-
paign pin.ld at 1862. Also the dissent 
asserted that the State had no basis for 
restricting political expression outside 
the polling place because a witness for 
the state could only establish a ratio-
nale for restrictions inside the facility. 
ld 
The dissent also charged the plural-
ity with confusing history with neces-
sity. ld. Arguing that custom devel-
oped through tradition will not always 
remain necessary, the dissent asserted 
that moderns election are far less cor-
rupt than those of 100 years ago. Id. at 
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1863. The dissent, therefore, con-
cluded that it was no longer necessary 
to enforce sweeping suppression of 
political speech subject to the protec-
tion of the First Amendment. 
In addition to overbreadth, the dis-
sent noted that the statute discrimi-
nated in its regulation of speech. The 
dissent asserted that the plurality failed 
to inquire whether this discrimination 
was related to the pwported state inter-
est. Id. at 1864. The dissent opined 
that the State did not isolate any legiti-
mate state interest justifying the selec-
tive prohibition because the same evil 
can result from unrestricted conduct. 
Id. at 1865. 
Finally, the dissent argued that the 
plurality's opinion represents a depar-
ture from the "strict scrutiny" stan-
dard. Id. First, the Court replaced the 
requirement of a showing of "neces-
sity" with the need to show 
longstanding tradition. Id. Second, 
the Court modified the requirement of 
"narrowly drawn" by granting the State 
broad power to legislate in a prospec-
tive manner in an effort to respond to 
possible future difficulties. Id. Third, 
the dissent noted that if the State no 
longer needs to show that other expres-
sive conduct does not pose the same 
danger, it no longer has the burden of 
showing justification for the law. Id. at 
1866. The dissent thus concluded that 
the presence of campaign workers out-
side a polling place was not more than 
a minor nuisance and that there was no 
justification for suppressing their free-
dom of speech. Id. at 1866-67. 
By its ruling in Burson, the Su-
preme Court perpetuates the 
longstanding tradition of allowing a 
state to regulate the areas surrounding 
a polling facility on election day. How-
ever, because this is only a plurality 
decision, with a strong dissent, this 
ruling may represent a departure from 
this tradition. In addition, Burson v. 
Freeman is significant because it holds 
that the right to freely cast a ballot in an 
election is a fundamental right which 
justifies limiting an individual's right 
to freedom of speech. 
- Julie Buchwald 
Jacobson v. United States: ENTRAP-
MENT DEFENSE PREVAILED 
WHERE GOVERNMENT FAILED 
TO PROVE CRIMINAL PREDIS-
PosmON EXISTED BEFORE IN-
VESTIGATION INDUCED DE-
FENDANTTOBREAKTHELAW. 
In Jacobson v. United States, 112 
S. Ct. 1535 (1992), the United States 
Supreme Court held that once the de-
fense of entrapment is asserted, the 
government must establish that acrimi-
nal defendant's independent predispo-
sition to commit the crime for which he 
was arrested existed before the initia-
tion ofa government investigation into 
the matter. The Court concluded that 
as a matter of law the prosecution 
failed to generate sufficient evidence 
to support a jury verdict that the defen-
dant possessed the requisite prior crimi-
nal disposition beyond a reasonable 
doubt. 
In 1984, Nebraska farmer Keith 
Jacobson ordered magazines contain-
ing photos of nude teen and preteen 
boys from an adult bookstore in Cali-
fornia. Jacobson legally received these 
publications and he maintained that he 
expected them to include pictures of 
young men, eighteen years of age or 
older. Congress subsequently passed 
the Child Protection Act of 1984, 18 
U.S.C. § 2252(1984), which made the 
receipt of sexually explicit pictures of 
children through the mail illegal. In an 
effort to enforce the new law and to 
target potential offenders, government 
officials obtained Jacobson's name 
from the mailing list of the California 
bookstore. 
Under the guise of promoting sexual 
freedom and freedom of choice, fed-
eral law enforcement agents posed as 
representatives of various lobbying 
organizations, seeking responses to 
several questionnaires and surveys in 
an attempt to determine Jacobson's 
sexual preferences and propensity to 
violate the law. From these correspon-
dences, the Government succeeded in 
eliciting an indication of his interest in 
preteen homosexual materials, but un-
covered no other evidence that Jacobson 
had intentionally possessed child por-
nography in contravention of the law. 
After continuing its mailings over a 
period of twenty-six months, the Gov-
ernment sent letters to Jacobson from 
fictitious companies which decried 
censorship and the hysteria concerning 
pornography. The letters also invited 
him to request more information about 
ordering materials depicting young 
boys engaged in various sexual activi-
ties. Iacobson responded to these cor-
respondences and received brochures 
from the bogus companies. Although 
he never received the materials he had 
ordered from the first mailing, Jacobson 
was arrested after a controlled delivery 
of his second catalogue order of a 
publication containing sexually explicit 
photographs of young males. 
Jacobson was indicted in the United 
States District Court for the District of 
Nebraska for violating the Child Pro-
tection Act. In a search of his home, 
the Government found no materials 
related to child pornography exceptthe 
two original legally ordered magazines 
and the correspondences sent by law 
enforcement agents during their inves-
tigation. At trial, Jacobson testified 
that he ordered the magazines because 
the Government had succeeded in 
arousing his curiosity. Although the 
jury was instructed on the defense of 
entrapment, Jacobson was convicted 
On appeal, the United States Court of 
Appeals for the Eighth Circuit, sitting 
en bane. affirmed the lower court's 
decision and concluded that Jacobson 
was not entrapped as a matter of law. 
The Supreme Court thereafter granted 
certiorari to review the issue ofentrap-
ment. 
The Court began its analysis by 
recognizing that the Government in its 
law enforcement capacity may afford 
an opportunity for the commission of 
an offense. Jacobson, 112 S. Ct. at 
1540. It may not, however, employ its 
agents to instill in an innocent person's 
mind the inclination to commit a crime, 
and then induce a criminal act in order 
to prosecute. Id. The Court concluded 
that where Government agents have 
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